The stream cipher WG-7 is a lightweight variant of the well-known WelchGong (WG) stream cipher family, targeted to resource-constrained devices like RFID tags, smart cards, and wireless sensor nodes. Recently, a distinguishing attack was discovered against the stream cipher WG-7 by Orumiehchiha, Pieprzyk and Steinfeld. In this paper, we extend their work to a general distinguishing attack and suggest criteria to protect the WG stream cipher family from this attack. Our analysis shows that by properly choosing the minimal polynomial of the linear feedback shift register for a WG stream cipher, the general distinguishing attack can be easily thwarted.
Among more than 20 submissions, the WG stream cipher family is the only candidate that has mathematically proven randomness properties such as ideal two-level autocorrelation, long period, ideal tuple distribution, and exact linear complexity. Those properties are paramount for protecting communication systems from various malicious attacks by attackers and increase the robustness of the signal transmission through noisy wireless communication networks. The WG stream ciphers are hardware-oriented stream ciphers that use a word-oriented linear feedback shift register (LFSR) and a filter function based on the WG transformation [2] . Depending on application scenarios, the WG stream cipher family can be parameterized to provide security solutions for a wide range of embedded applications such as smart cards, wireless sensor nodes, mobile phones, etc. For example, the stream cipher WG-7 [5] is a lightweight variant of the WG stream cipher family tailored for securing low-cost RFID tags.
Recently, Orumiehchiha et al. [8] proposed a distinguishing attack on the stream cipher WG-7. The authors built two distinguishers and showed that the key stream generated by WG-7 can be distinguished from a random sequence after obtaining 2 13.5 keystream bits and with a nonnegligible probability. While the proposed distinguishing attack does not affect the security of the WG stream cipher in practice, we would like to provide a deep insight about this kind of distinguishing attack when applied to the WG stream cipher and propose effective countermeasures in this contribution. To this end, we first extend Orumiehchiha et al.'s distinguishing attack to a much more general setting by building a k-order distinguisher. We then characterize some criteria for protecting the WG stream cipher family from the general distinguishing attack. Our analysis shows that by properly selecting the minimal polynomial of the LFSR for a WG stream cipher, the general distinguishing attack can be easily defeated.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief introduction about the WG stream cipher and the distinguishing attack proposed in [8] . The generalization of the Orumiehchiha et al.'s distinguishing attack will be addressed in Section 3. The criteria for protecting the WG stream ciphers from this attack is discussed in Section 4.
Preliminaries
In this section, we will introduce necessary definitions and results which will be used later. For the definitions and results of linear register feedback sequences, please refer to [1] . The following notations will be used throughout the paper.
-We denote a finite field GF(2 n ) as F 2 n , and F * 2 n , the multiplicative group of
-a = {a i }, a sequence over F 2 , is called a binary sequence. If a is a periodic sequence with period v, then we also denote a 
for k such that 3k ≡ 1 mod m. Then the function WGP :
is called the WG permutation, and the Boolean function WG :
is called the WG transformation of Tr(t(x)), or the WG transformation for short. Note that the WG permutations and transformations exist only if m (mod 3) = 0. Moreover, let θ be a primitive element of F 2 m , define two sequences a = {a i } and b = {b i } as
Then b is called a WG transformation sequence of a, or a WG sequence for short. The WG sequences have many good properties, for instance ideal two-level autocorrelation, ideal 2-tuple distribution, balancedness, etc. Interested readers may refer to [2] for more details on WG transformations and WG sequences.
Description of WG cipher
A WG cipher can be regarded as a nonlinear filter generator over an extension field [7] . A WG cipher, as shown in Fig. 1 , consists of a linear feedback shift register (LFSR), followed by a WG transformation. The LFSR generates an m-sequence over F 2 m with period 2 n − 1 where n = ml and the connecting polynomial is a primitive polynomial p(x) over F 2 m with degree l with p(
The feedback signal Init is used only in the initialization phase of operation. When the cipher is running, the only feedback is within the LFSR and the output of the 
where WG(·) is defined in Section 2.1. Particularly, for the WG-7 cipher WG(7, 23) in [5] , the characteristic polynomial
, and the finite field F 2 7 is generated by the primitive polynomial
A distinguishing attack on WG(7, 23)
Recently, Orumiehchiha et al. [8] discovered a distinguishing attack on WG(7, 23).
The main idea is to use the linear relationship among the terms of the m-sequence {a i } generated by the LFSR to build the approximated linear relationship of the WG sequence s i = WG(a i ), i ≥ 0 (here the initialization process is ignored). Recall that, for WG(7, 23) in [5] , the characteristic polynomial of the LFSR p(
. Two approximations of the linear equations used in [8] are listed below.
Linear relation of {a
We define
where 1397 = 11 × 127 and i ≥ 0 is an integer. In [8] , their respective probabilities of the events F 1 = 0 and F 2 = 0 are given by
Note In [8] , there is a typo in the bias of P{F 1 (a 11+i , a i ) = 0}, which should be 2
as shown above.
Remark 1 It is mentioned in Section 2.1 that the sequence generated by WG(x) is balanced and has ideal 2-level autocorrelation, which implies that both {s i } and {s i + s i+τ } are balanced for any nonzero τ . But the sum of more than two WG sequences could be either balanced or imbalanced.
We will conclude this section by giving a lemma in [6] which will be used later. bits in order to distinguish the two distributions with a non-negligible probability of success.
High order distinguisher from linear relations of the recursive relation of LFSRs
In [8] , the linear approximations of WG-7 were obtained from the characteristic polynomial p(x) = x 23 + x 11 + β, β ∈ F 2 7 of the LFSR. However, this attack can be generalized to the case that the characteristic polynomial has more than three terms. In this section, we will introduce a general distinguisher which exists for any filtering generator with or without memory.
Linear relation of m-sequences
be a primitive polynomial of degree l. The following two properties for finite fields and m-sequences can be easily derived from the theory of finite fields [4] and m-sequences [1] .
Property 1 Let α be a root of p(x) in its splitting f ield F 2 ml . Then for any integer
Proof The result follows from the fact that g(α) is an element of F 2 ml and α is a generator of the multiplicative group of F 2 ml .
Property 2 Let {a i } be an m-sequence generated by p(x). Then there exists some
From Properties 1 and 2, the following results are followed immediately.
Property 3
With the notation in Property 1, we have
Or equivalently,
where
The relation given by (3) is referred to as a k-order linear relation of a remote term of the LFSR, which is determined by the minimal polynomial p(x) of a = {a i }. The following result is from ideal k-tuple distribution of m-sequences (see [1] ).
Property 4 Let a = {a i }, a i ∈ F 2 m be an m-sequence generated by p(x) of degree l and
0 ≤ i 0 < · · · < i k−1 < 2 ml −1 2 m −1 such that {a j+iv }, v = 0, · · · , k − 1, regarded as a vector of F N 2 where N = 2 ml − 1, are linear independent over F 2 . Then for any (b 0 , · · · , b k−1 ) ∈ F k 2 m , 1 ≤ k ≤ l,
the following results hold:
Note that the independent condition in Property 4 is equivalent to saying that
k-Order correlation of Boolean functions
Let f (x) be a function from F 2 m to F 2 with f (0) = 0 and
When f is the WG transform, we have v = l − 1 as specified in Section 2.2. Now, for any t
We define the following two subsets of F
Clearly, we have A(t, u) + D(t, u) = 2 mk and then
The probability that F (t,u) is equal to zero is
Using (7), we have
k-Order distinguisher
From Property 3, we can build the following distinguisher for a pseudo-random sequence {s i }.
k-Order distinguisher Assume that
The event F u (a j+i0 , a j+i1 , · · · , a j+ik−1 ) = 0 is called a k-order distinguisher when the following probability holds
From the definition of F (t,u) in (5), we have
, the bias can be determined through the computation of the k-order correlation of f at (t, u), i.e. f (t, u) under some conditions. (Note. The following result is a general case of cross correlation of two geometry sequences in [3] .)
where t = (t 0 , · · · , t k−1 ) and u = (1, · · · , 1).
Using a similar approach as for f (t), we get
Denote z = (t, u) = (t 0 , · · · , t k−1 , 1, · · · , 1) for simplicity. Since (i 0 , · · · , i k−1 ) satisfies the condition in Property 4, by Property 4, then we may use the substitution a j+it ↔ x t as shown below.
where the constant −1 comes from
Substituting the above identity into (14), we have
Thus, the assertion is established.
From Proposition 1, the bias of F is computed through
provided the condition of Property 4. Now let f (x) = WG(x) in (15). According to Lemma 1, the k-order distinguisher of WG(m, l) needs O( −2 ) bits to distinguish the key stream of WG(m, l) cipher from a truly random sequence generator. Furthermore WG(m, l) generator needs to generate at least τ bits at one session of the encryption, where τ is defined in Property 1. The reason is that in order to compute y j it needs to know the remote bit s j+τ and (s j+i0 , · · · , s j+ik−1 ) for computing the bias of the distinguisher. In order to get s j+τ , the generator has to generate s 0 , · · · , s j+τ −1 for one j.
Note that O( −2 ) bits can be collected from different sessions, and they may not be consecutive. How to estimate f (1, · · · , 1) is a hard problem. However, for small m and k, it can be determined through computation.
Remark 2 When u = (1, · · · , 1), this type of distinguisher cannot be constructed in practice as explained below. From (3) in Property 3, since t j ∈ F 2 m , together with the trace representation of m-sequences in Property 2, we may rewrite as follows
In this case, the bias of F (t,u) cannot be computed by the method of Proposition 1. On the other hand, the k-order distinguisher F (t,u) = 0 requests to obtain the remote terms of the key stream bits s j+τ , s j+τ0 , · · · , s j+τk−1 , which demands that the generator should generate at least
bits in one session. For example, in WG(7, 23), it requests that WG (7, 23) generates at least
≈ 2 154 bits in one session, which is infeasible in practice.
Example 1
The distinguishers F 1 and F 2 on WG(7, 23).
1. The distinguisher F 1 on WG(7, 23), defined in Section 2.3 is the 2-order distinguisher. In other words, the bias of F 1 is computed through
where (t 0 , t 1 ) = (β, 1) and u = (1, 1) in [8] , which has the bias 2 −7.415 . We can easily verify that the bias of
is 2 −6.299 which is larger than F (β, 1, 1, 1) . However, this function does not satisfy the condition of Property 4, thus Proposition 1 cannot be applied. In other words, the bias of
where a j+τ = βa j + a j+11 cannot be computed through the bias of F (β,1,β,1) (x 0 , x 1 ). On the other hand, in order to have the distinguisher, it also requests that WG(7, 23) generates more 2 154 bits in one session, as discussed in Remark 2, which is infeasible. 2. For the distinguisher F 2 on WG(7, 23), because {a j } j≥0 , {a j+12 } j≥0 , and {a j+1397 } j≥0 are linear independent, through mapping
then k = 3 and the bias of the 3-order distinguisher can be computed in terms of the bias
where t = u = (1, 1, 1) , which has 3m = 21 variables.
Resiliency characteristic polynomials against k-order distinguisher attacks
Theoretically we can always build a k-order distinguisher as stated in Section 3. However, in practice, this type of the distinguishers can be easily defeated by selecting p(x) such that either τ is over the current computational technology or We may select p(x) to satisfy the following conditions where α is a root of p(x) in F 2 ml .
Resiliency Condition for p(x):
Choosing p(x) such that there is no k-order linear relation of a remote term for τ ≤ 1 and k ≤ 2 , where 1 is determined by the computational power of the current technology, say 2 40 for a moderate computer, and 2 , by the bias or equivalently, f (t, 1, · · · , 1) in (11). In other words, we have the following two conditions.
A primitive polynomial p(x) satisfies the above two conditions is called a resilient feedback polynomial of WG(m, l) with respect to the threshold values ( 1 , 2 ). 
Remark 4
The conditions on (τ, k) implies that the characteristic polynomial used in WG(m, l) should have at least (k + 1) terms. Otherwise, it has the k-order distinguisher whose bias is computed by the bias of
where for one j. Note that those bits cannot be collected from different communication sessions with different keys and IVs, because the attacker cannot distinguish the indexes of the key streams from different sessions. Thus, this type of distinguisher cannot be built. Even the generator can output more than 2 40 bits, which make it possible to build this distinguisher. However, in this case, k > 2 = 8. Thus, the time complexity for computing for distinguisher F in m 2 variables is more than 2 63 , since mk > m 2 , the time complexity for making the distinguisher work is more than 2 63 , which is infeasible in terms of the current computing technology. Note that it can be checked for Case 1 in Proposition 2 up to k = 6. However, the complexity to check whether there is no k-order distinguisher to satisfy the resiliency condition in Case 2 is high.
Conclusion
In this article, we introduce a general k-order distinguisher to a filtering generator over extension fields, such as the WG stream cipher family. We provide an analytic method to compute the biases of the distinguishers in terms of the filtering function. We provide the countermeasures to this type of distinguishers by properly choosing the minimal polynomial of the LFSR for a WG stream cipher. Thus, this type of distinguishing attacks can be easily defeated.
